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Abstract
Background: Freedom of conscience is a core element of human rights respected by most European countries. It
allows abortion through the inclusion of a conscience clause, which permits opting out of providing such services.
However, the grounds for invoking conscientious objection lack clarity. Our aim in this paper is to take a step in this
direction by carrying out a systematic review of reasons by midwives and nurses for declining, on conscience
grounds, to participate in abortion.
Method: We conducted a systematic review of ethical arguments asking, “What reasons have been reported in the
argument based literature for or against conscientious objection to abortion provision by nurses or midwives?” We
particularly wanted to identify any discussion of the responsibilities of midwives and nurses in this area. Search
terms were conscientious objection and abortion or termination and nurse or midwife or midwives or physicians or
doctors or medics within the dates 2000–2016 on: HEIN legal, Medline, CINAHL, Psychinfo, Academic Search
Complete, Web of Science including publications in English, German and Dutch. Final articles were subjected to a
rigorous analysis, coding and classifying each line into reason mentions, narrow and broad reasons for or against
conscientious objection.
Results: Of an initial 1085 articles, 10 were included. We identified 23 broad reasons, containing 116narrow reasons
and 269 reason mentions. Eighty one (81) narrow reasons argued in favour of and 35 against conscientious
objection. Using predetermined categories of moral, practical, religious or legal reasons, “moral reasons” contained
the largest number of narrow reasons (n = 58). The reasons and their associated mentions in this category
outnumber those in the sum of the other three categories.
Conclusions: We identified no absolute argument either for or against conscientious objection by midwives or
nurses. An invisibility of midwives and nurses exists in the whole debate concerning conscientious objection
reflecting a gap between literature and practice, as it is they whom WHO recommend as providers of this service.
While the arguments in the literature emphasize the need for provision of conscientious objection, a balanced
debate is necessary in this field, which includes all relevant health professionals.
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Background
Freedom of conscience is a core element of human
rights that in Europe is protected in documents such as
the European Convention on Human Rights (EHCR) [1].
Under this Resolution, any person who feels that his or
her rights under the Resolution have been violated, has
recourse to an appeal to the European Court of Human
Rights whose judgements are binding upon the countries
concerned. Article 9 of the Resolution specifically states
that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom
to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.
Around the same time as key stakeholders in Europe
were discussing respect for conscience, another debate
was being brought to the fore in health care and in polit-
ical circles in some countries by women’s and social
health lobbyists and commentators. Concerns had been
raised that high numbers of women were dying or being
seriously mutilated from illegal abortions [2]. Subse-
quently, laws ensuring the safe provision of abortion
were gradually enacted throughout Europe and else-
where, with abortion on request currently available in
69% of the world’s developed countries [3].
As such laws became enacted in each country, for the
most part, they included a conscience clause which per-
mitted opting out of providing such services on con-
science grounds [4]. The 1967 UK Abortion Act, for
example, states that “no one is under any duty to partici-
pate, contrary to his or her conscience, in any treatment
authorised by the Act”; although the exemption does not
apply where treatment “is necessary to save the life or to
prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or men-
tal health of a pregnant woman” [5]. In Europe these
laws and the Convention on Human Rights have been
supported and reinforced by the Council’s Resolution
1763, which specifically focuses on the right to conscien-
tious objection in lawful medical care but ensuring that
women’s lawful access to abortion is also protected [4].
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century the
procedures for carrying out abortion have changed.
Now, the widespread availability of the “morning after
pill”, which can be prescribed by pharmacists, enables
self-medication within 48 h of unprotected sexual inter-
course. Similarly, in the early stages of pregnancy the
woman may self-administer medication, under the pre-
scription and supervision of a medical practitioner in ap-
proved premises. After about the 14th week of
pregnancy, the procedure involves induction of labour
and it is often midwives who are the main care providers
during labour. These changes are strongly supported by
the World Health Organisation (WHO) which recom-
mends that midwives or nurses should be the key pro-
viders of abortion services [6]. Hence, the direct
provision of abortion services concerns health profes-
sionals, such as midwives as well as nurses and doctors.
Abortion remains a morally contentious issue with
some midwives and nurses declining to participate in it
on the grounds of conscience. The International Confed-
eration of Midwives’ Code of Ethics clearly supports this
stance, stating that “midwives may decide not to partici-
pate in activities for which they hold deep moral oppos-
ition” [7] although this does not address how the
necessary care may be provided. Conversely, the WHO’s
recent guidelines on abortion [8] do not address the
issue of conscientious objection at all.
When conscientious objection is discussed in rela-
tion to health care settings responsible for the
provision of legal abortion, it often becomes the
centre of acrimonious debate between practitioners as
well as academics. They are divided as to the rights
and wrongs both of the procedure itself and of health
professionals’ objections to participating in the pro-
cedure. Pellegrino summed up the arguments as both
the patient and the health professional being “entitled
to respect for their personal autonomy. Neither one is
empowered to override the other. The protection of
freedom of conscience is owed to both” [9:241].
There is thus still polarisation on how much weight to
give to the rights and responsibilities of health profes-
sionals to offer an abortion service and their rights to
conscientiously object to participating in it. Authors on
both sides of the debate state that European countries
should critically assess the laws governing conscientious
objection and their effects on women’s legal rights to a
service [9, 10]. However, in this paper we argue that
before such a step is taken, the grounds for invoking
conscientious objection need to be clear. Our aim in this
paper is to take a step in this direction by carrying out a
systematic review of reasons by midwives and nurses for
declining, on conscience grounds, to participate in
abortion.
Method
The idea of conducting systematic reviews of ethical
arguments is a relatively new phenomenon. McCullough
et al. argued that clinicians and policy makers would
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benefit from some kind of synthesis of the ethical argu-
ments surrounding particular issues, and developed a
methodology for conducting such reviews, which
assessed quality-weighted conclusions reached in the
ethical literature. This begins by formulating an ethical
question and then assesses the conclusions of articles
addressing that question [11]. Strech and Sofaer put for-
ward a critique of this method arguing that McCullough
et al.’s way of measuring the quality of the ethical argu-
ments is inadequate, and that such reviews may mislead
clinicians and policy makers. In the present review,
we have used the method developed by Strech and
Sofaer [12]. They strongly recommend that the ques-
tion to be investigated should be factual rather than
ethical, as in McCullough et al.’s approach. This was
a key reason for our choosing this approach, as our
focus was on evaluating the “reasons” put forward in
the literature for or against conscientious objection by
midwives and nurses to the provision of abortion ser-
vices. Strech and Sofaer argue that their model aims
to “improve ethically relevant decisions in healthcare,
research or policy” which corresponds with our aim
in this systematic review of reasons [13:125]. They
propose a four step approach: formulating and
reviewing both the question and eligibility criteria,
identifying all the literature that meets the criteria,
extracting and synthesising data, deriving and present-
ing answers to the review question.
Fig. 1 Electronic search for literature identification and the selection process
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Formulation of the review question and eligibility criteria
The initial question we chose for this review was: “What
reasons have been reported in the argument based aca-
demic literature for or against conscientious objection to
abortion provision by health professionals?” Prior to be-
ginning the review, to reflect the change in process of
inducing abortion, we replaced “health professionals”
with “midwives” or “nurses”. The modification was made
as we had observed that the roles and perspectives of
midwives and nurses often differed from other health
professionals, such as pharmacists or physicians in these
situations [13].
In order to answer the question we first agreed search
terms of conscientious objection and abortion or termin-
ation and nurse or midwife or midwives or physician or
doctor or medic (physician hereafter). We decided to in-
clude physicians in the review, as midwives and nurses
are held by the World Health Organisation to be mid-
level health care providers, subservient to physicians in
most health service structures. If we had excluded them,
then important literature may have been missed as often
midwives and nurses appear in the text of articles but
are not shown in the results of the search.
Identification of all the literature meeting the eligibility
criteria
We undertook an initial search within the dates 2000–
2016 using the following databases: HEIN legal, Medline,
CINAHL, Psychinfo, Academic Search Complete Web of
Science including publications in English, German and
Dutch. The dates reflect changes to abortion provision
which have taken place at a faster pace in the twenty-
first century than previously. Each of the authors took
responsibility for one domain i.e. legal, ethical and
health. In total 1085 records were identified; 1082 re-
cords through electronic database searches and a further
3 were later added from references.
In accordance with the chosen method, in the first
screening round we checked the results of the search in
each domain for suitability of inclusion in determining
whether or not abortion was the primary focus of the
article based on its title and abstract and excluded 792
articles. A total of 293 records were saved for further
scrutiny. In the second round of screening we compared
remaining articles from each database and removed a
further 157 articles because of duplication.
The full texts of the resulting 136 articles were
screened in round three and each read by two authors
looking for the common threads. They were checked
with a focus on eligibility criteria (see below). At this
stage, the team made the decision to eliminate those
which only referred to physicians as they hold a more
autonomous role than other health professionals in most
health care systems This resulted in the exclusion of 89
articles. Forty seven articles remained and were screened
in round four. Two of the authors read each independ-
ently and those which did not include clear reasons for
or against conscientious objection were removed on this
ground. The first two reviewers’ independent results tal-
lied in all but three of the articles. The third reviewer
then had access to the spreadsheets and concurred, me-
diating where necessary to reach a solution agreed by all.
The screening process in round four resulted in an ex-
clusion of 37 articles. The remaining 10 articles were
then included in this review. The process is summarised
in Fig. 1. Table 1 provides a list of all articles that were
included in our systematic review of reasons.
Extraction and synthesis of data
Strech and Sofaer’s approach [12] recognises that inter-
pretative work occurs when reasons are identified. They
argue that the process of systematically reviewing rea-
sons incorporates a detailed focus on the whole text and
in different paragraphs that result in specific findings.
Grounded in this understanding, they use the term “rea-
son mention” for a reason expressed by a specific pas-
sage in the original text. We thus adopted the term
“reason mention” in our study for all identified text pas-
sages that addressed a reason for or against conscien-
tious objection to be faithful to the method.
Based on the identified reason mentions, Strech and
Sofaer recommend the development of a hierarchy of
narrow and broad reasons. This means that each reason
mention becomes assigned first to a narrow and then a
broad reason and ultimately a category.
According to Strech and Sofaer “narrow reason” is the
term that is provided by the researcher for the previ-
ously identified reason mention. Each reason mention is
Table 1 Final articles used
Bowman MS, Schandevel CP. The harmony between professional
conscience rights and patients´ right of access. Phoenix L Rev. 2012;
6:31–62.
Cavanaugh TA. Professional conscientious objection in medicine with
attention to referral. Philosophy. Ave Maria L Rev. 2010;9:1
Chavkin W, Leitman L, Polin K. Conscientious objection and refusal to
provide reproductive healthcare: a White Paper examining prevalence,
health consequences, and policy responses. Int J Gynecol
Obstet.2013;123:S41–56.
Fovargue S, Neal M. ‘In good conscience’: conscience-based exemptions
and proper medical treatment. Med Law Rev.2015;23(2):221–241.
Greenawalt K. Refusals of conscience: what are they and when should
they be accommodated? Ave Maria L Rev. 2010;9(1):47–65.
Greenawalt K. Religious toleration and claims of conscience. J L & Pol.
2013;23:91–128.
Pellegrino ED. The physician’s conscience, conscience clause, and
religious belief: a catholic perspective. Fordham Urban Law J.
2002;30:221–44.
Sawicki NN. The hollow promise of freedom of conscience. Cardozo L
Rev.2012;4:1389–1449.
Sepper, E. Taking conscience seriously. Va L Rev. 2012;98:1502–7155.
Sepper E. Not only the doctor’s dilemma: the complexity of conscience
in medicine. Faulkner L Rev. 2013;4:385–410.
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initially attributed to a narrow reason after the first in-
terpretative work of the researcher. We conducted this
step of creating narrow reasons with the utmost care be-
cause our interpretative work was inevitably of a subject-
ive nature. We ensured transparency by working with
spreadsheets that allowed retracing all narrow reasons
back to the original reason mention. The second loop of
interpretative work according to Strech and Sofaer is to
attribute each narrow reason to a “broad reason”. Broad
reasons are the findings that emerge through the de-
tailed process of systematically reviewing, interpreting
and grouping narrow reasons together. Finally, Strech
and Sofaer developed, at a higher level, categories
encompassing all the broad reasons.
One of the authors first went through each article in
detail and identified reason mentions in each of the se-
lected publications. Spreadsheets were created for each
reason mention and, using the qualitative software ana-
lysis tool MAXQDA, the same author grouped them
into a number of narrow reasons. Thereafter, these nar-
row reasons were discussed with another author. Some
of the reason mentions that we identified initially were
discarded as they did not provide reasons for or against
conscientious objection. We identified some arguments
in the articles that were not directly related to our re-
search question but were consequences that resulted
from the arguments for or against conscientious objec-
tion. We summed them up under “consequence argu-
ments” and did not discuss them further. The narrow
reasons were then grouped together into broad reasons
by the same two authors. Finally, we developed four cat-
egories, which encompassed all the reasons covered in
the articles: legal, moral, practical and religious reasons.
As also noted by Strech and Sofaer, some reason men-
tions could embrace more than one narrow reason, like-
wise some narrow reasons could embrace more than
one broad reason and some broad reason could embrace
more than one category. We addressed this initially
where appropriate. However, ultimately, we decided in
cases of such conflicts to place each narrow reason in
only one broad reason and each broad reason in one cat-
egory by joint decisions in order to avoid unnecessary
confusion. The remaining two authors reviewed the final
tables showing the categories, the broad and narrow rea-
sons and the reason mentions.
Derive and present results
Sofaer and Strech adopt a numerical hierarchy to priori-
tising results and in another of their publications they
class the most frequently mentioned reason as the stron-
gest [14]. The hierarchy for ordering them was the num-
ber of broad reasons, thereafter the number of narrow
reasons and finally the number of reason mentions. We
have followed this in the present article so as to remain
faithful to the chosen method.
Results
Of the 10 articles that we included, seven derive from
legal scholars in the USA. Two come from physicians
and one from a philosopher also based in the USA, the
final being written by two lawyers in the UK. None were
written by midwives or nurses.
Our review illustrated that there are more reasons that
argue for the provision of conscientious objection than
against it. Of the 116 narrow reasons we identified, 81
narrow reasons were for conscientious objection (70%)
and 35 narrow reasons against conscientious objection
(30%).
Table 2 shows the broad reasons, narrow reasons and
reason mentions within the articles included in this re-
view related to their associated categories of moral, prac-
tical, religious or legal reasons. It is immediately evident
that within the four pre-determined categories, that of
“moral reasons” had by far the largest number of both
broad and narrow reasons and reason mentions. The
reasons and their associated mentions in this category
outnumber those in the sum of the other three
categories.
The detailed analysis of our findings identified broad
and narrow reasons in every category. Tables 3, 4, 5, 6
present each of the categories with their related broad
and narrow reasons for and against conscientious objec-
tion. Broad reasons are used as subheadings, each being
followed by a bracket. The numbers used in this bracket
refer to the number of narrow reasons that were used to
argue for conscientious objection (+), the number of
narrow reasons that were used to argue against con-
scientious objection(−) and the number of reason men-
tions (rm) that the broad reason contains. This means
that, for example, the broad reason “respecting import-
ance of conscience” (+ 11/− 1, rm.:24) includes 11 nar-
row reasons that were used to argue for and one narrow
reason against conscientious objection, based on 24 rea-
son mentions. The detailed analysis of each category
separately was shown to be especially important for the
category of moral reasons. This category showed that
more than 80% of the total narrow reasons in all
Table 2 Overview of findings
Number of
broad reasons
Number of
narrow reasons
(for/against CO)
Number of
reason mentions
Moral reasons 11 58 (47/11) 150
Practical reasons 5 30 (14/16) 52
Religious reasons 4 15 (12/3) 28
Legal reasons 3 13 (8/5) 39
Total 23 116 (81/35) 269
Fleming et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2018) 19:31 Page 5 of 13
categories argued for the provision of conscientious
objection. The predominant provision of narrow reasons
in favour of conscientious objection was also identified
in the categories of religious and legal reasons. However,
the category of practical reasons showed slightly more
narrow reasons that predominantly argued against the
provision of conscientious objection.
In line with our search for reasons of argument-based
literature addressing conscientious objection, we not
only analysed each category, as outlined in Tables 3, 4, 5,
6, but also considered each broad reason in detail inde-
pendently of its attributed category. This “trans-categor-
ical view” enabled us to focus on the content and on the
argument itself. Table 7 provides an overview of all iden-
tified broad reasons that were used to argue for or
against conscientious objection in the literature included
in this review. It also includes one example of a reason
mention underpinning each broad reason.
Table 3 Moral Reasons
Moral Reasons
Respecting importance of conscience or CO (+ 11/− 1; rm.:24)
+ Conscience is an inner voice that requires to be listened to (6)
+ Freedom of conscience is a moral right (4)
+ CO reflects objective moral truth (2)
+ Conflicts of conscience are a regular feature of moral life (2)
+ Degree of intensity and magnitude of an act underlies moral
judgment (2)
+ Society and Values, individual liberty and autonomy (1)
+ Respects personal beliefs (1)
- Moral judgment leads to` values´ (2)
+ Conscience is the “law of the intellect” (1)
+ Conscience is related to personal identification (1)
+ Conscience implies a strong moral conviction (1)
+ Conscience involves a certain intensity of conviction (1)
Criteria for CO (+ 9/−2; rm.:36)
- Physicians must separate moral belief from professional life (9)
+ HCP’s position must be consistent with their other beliefs and
actions (7)
+ Conscience is not one-sided (7)
+ HCP have differing attitudes towards conscience (2)
+ Objection must be to the treatment (2)
+ Position held must be sincere (2)
+ Rationale must reflect valid view of service’s goals (2)
+ Position emerges after alternatives considered (2)
+ Position must fit within coherent system of ethical beliefs (1)
+ Mystifying characteristic: Not backed by reason or logic (1)
- Position poses risk to HCP’s moral integrity (1)
Moral integrity needs to be respected (+ 5/−1; rm.:22)
- Women have an access right (12)
+ Acting against own conscience causes moral distress (4)
+ Patient has a moral right to informed consent and refusal (3)
+ Conscience may extend beyond moral reasoning (1)
+ Most compelling moral basis (1)
+ Protection of individual liberty (1)
Normative value of CO (+ 4/−1; rm.:13)
+ Fundamental principle of a pluralistic society (4)
+ Core of humanity (3)
+ Intrinsic value is autonomy and human flourishing (3)
+ Conscience is not infallible (2)
- CO as synonym for refusal to deliver abortions (1)
CO protects HCP (+ 5/−0; rm.:9)
+ Conscientious position is an “ethical position” of a HCP (5)
+ CO credits the individual conviction against general perception (1)
+ CO encompasses more than simply not performing the intervention
(1)
Table 3 Moral Reasons (Continued)
Moral Reasons
+ CO considers one’s own conduct not that of another (1)
+ CO is a vehicle for HCP who regard such requests objectionable (1)
Conscience is closely related to identity and sense of self (+ 4/−1; rm.:8)
+ Conscience is central to being a whole person (2)
+ Conscience is experienced in relation to own actions (2)
- Toleration of moral diversity is plausible and questionable (2)
+ Conscience is a driver of human behaviour (1)
+ Failure to follow own conscience generates regret and guilt (1)
Respect for autonomy (+ 3/−1; rm.:10)
- CO may heighten risk for women living in precarious circumstances
(5)
+ Value-neutral care is impossible to be provided (3)
+ Professional CO reflects autonomy of the profession (1)
+ Choices of the patient may be ethically unacceptable (1)
Ignoring conscience of HCP is a form of discrimination (+ 3/− 0; rm.:3)
+ Loss of self-respect (1)
+ Discrimination against well-performing practitioners (1)
+ Discrimination related to religious conscience (1)
Requirement to offer a service (+ 1/−2; rm.:11)
- Three main arguments for “access” can be rebutted (4)
- There are biased assumptions of forced access position (4)
+ Consequences follow when conscience rights are eliminated (3)
Freedom of conscience (+ 2/−0; rm.:7)
+ Both the “willing” / “refusing” provider have conscience (6)
+ Conscience is a societal value (1)
Imposing own beliefs (+ 0/−2; rm.:7)
- Violation of physician’s conscience (5)
- Patient care over adherence to religious doctrines or self-interest (2)
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When we explored all the broad reasons in detail, we
identified eight as containing narrow reasons that either
argued only for or against conscientious objection. Six of
these, embracing all four categories, supported conscien-
tious objection while two, one from each of moral and
legal reasons, were against it. Nine broad reasons con-
tained narrow reasons predominantly arguing for con-
scientious objection while three were neutral and four
Table 4 Practical Reasons
Practical Reasons
Institutional refusal (+ 4/− 10; rm.:23)
- Greater risk of patient injury in emergencies (3)
- Patients have fewer options (3)
- Fear that CO becomes widespread (2)
- Encourages refusal unrelated to moral reasoning (2)
- CO as exemption from general duties to obey the law (2)
+ CO cannot be limited to individuals (2)
+ Ethical and religious directives for Catholic health care (2)
+ May help HCP to change initial view (1)
+ Undervaluation of moral associations (1)
- Limits patient access (1)
- Failure of dissenting staff for emergencies (1)
- Best practice may not be possible for the HCP (1)
- Right to refuse may end in right to dictate care (1)
- Conflicts between CO and medical technologies (1)
Justifying professional CO (+ 3/−3; rm.:9)
- No common sense of what is “wrong” causes no need for
provision (3)
+ CO is evidence-based (2)
- HCP with strong CO is torn between belief and requirement (1)
- Formalistic argument to provide no exemption officials (1)
+ Institutions can be selective in offering services (1)
+ HCP may lack the intellectual or verbal skill to express CO (1)
Practice of disclosure creates risk for the HCP (+ 5/−0; rm.:13)
+ Professional disadvantages (7)
+ Suffers embarrassment and inconvenience (2)
+ Vulnerable to attacks from the other side (2)
+ Disadvantages in asserting claims (1)
+ Experiences personal safety in danger (1)
Degree of involvement among HCP is different (+ 1/− 2; rm.:5)
+ Expectations change over time (2)
- Intrinsic relevance is debatable (2)
- Function in a job is straightforward (1)
Organisational ethics require consideration (+ 1/−1; rm.:2)
- Choices constrained in emergencies when the closest hospital
is far off (1)
+ Benefit for society (1)
Table 5 Religious Reasons
Religious Reasons
Religion does not permit involvement (+ 6/−1; rm.:16)
+ Religious law should be followed (6)
+ It is a sin against God (2)
+ Religious premises are true (2)
+ Job was chosen due to `calling´ (2)
+ Conscientious objection due to eternal welfare (2)
+ Nonreligious-based argumentation of CO reflects professional
position (1)
- Catholic physicians should not become gynaecologists (1)
Religious convictions form conscience (+ 3/−0; rm.:7)
+ Humans have values (3)
+ Religious based reasoning against the provision of abortion
related care (3)
+ Religious HCP’s are confronted with serious conscience conflicts (1)
Religious toleration has multiple dimensions (+ 1/−2; rm.:3)
+ Patient’s religious values can collide with medical providers (1)
- Recognising an exemption is not necessarily basis for opposition (1)
- Conflicting claims of toleration and how to respond (1)
Controversies in religion-based argumentation (+ 2/−0; rm.:2)
+ Intrinsic plausibility of religious conclusions is difficult (1)
+ Conscience is equated with natural law (1)
Table 6 Legal Reasons
Legal Reasons
Safeguarding conscience (+ 6/−1; rm.:23)
+ Ethical dilemma can be addressed (7)
+ Protects HCP’s conscience (4)
+ Acknowledges legitimacy of conscience at institutional level (4)
+ Protection for individuals’ consciences (3)
- Authorises discriminatory refusals (2)
+ Should encourage ethical deliberation (2)
+ Provides a basis for professional grounds of CO (1)
Legality argument (+ 2/−2; rm.:14)
- HCP must suspend prolife conscience (5)
- Requires professionals who make it available (5)
+ Codified conscience laws are just as legal as abortion (3)
+ Legality is not a binary concept (1)
Critique of the conscience clause (+ 0/−2; rm.:2)
- Licenses harm to patients (3)
- Overlooks patient’s moral integrity (3)
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Table 7 Overview of broad reasons used to argue for or against CO
Broad reasons used to argue for or against CO Example of reason mentions
++: Broad reason containing
only narrow reasons arguing
for CO
CO protects HCP (+ 5/− 0;
rm.:9)[MR]
“We live in a society that has become increasingly individual over time, with
citizens encouraged to seek what is best for themselves. In one sense, a right
of conscience is a counter, focusing as it does on perceived obligation, not
self-satisfaction. But the right is strongly individualistic, crediting the individual’s
conviction against the general perception of what is socially desirable. One
might think that creating a legal right, especially a broad one not limited to
religious conviction, will contribute to an unhealthy sense that each individual
judges for herself, giving little or no weight to a sense of community
and to prevailing opinions within the society about what is needed.”
[15]
Ignoring conscience of
HCP is a form of
discrimination
(+ 3/− 0; rm.:3) [MR]
“Their feeling that they have yielded to compulsion and violated their
most deeply held beliefs and principles may involve profound
resentment and loss of self-respect.” [18]
Freedom of conscience
(+ 2/− 0; rm.:7) [MR]
“They assert that, because provision of care can be conscience based,
full respect for conscience requires accommodation of both objection
to participation and commitment to performance of services such that
the latter group of providers also have the right to not suffer discrimination
on thebasis of their convictions.” [19]
Practice of disclosure
creates risk for the
HCP (+ 5/− 0; rm.:13) [PR]
“Ironically, in most jurisdictions, the same facility-religious or not-may alternate
between refusing and willing. For example, a clinic that only refuses to provide
nontherapeutic abortions typically will have to accommodate a doctor who will
not participate in therapeutic abortions, sterilizations, or contraceptive care.”
[21]
Religious convictions
form conscience
(+ 3/− 0; rm.:7) [RR]
“Religious beliefs, which statutes and philosophical traditions recognize as a
basis for acts of conscience, may be of as fundamental significance to a
willing provider as they are to a refuser.” [21]
Controversies in religion-based
argumentation (+ 2/− 0; rm.:2) [RR]
“To highlight exclusively religiously based conscientious objection to the neglect
of professional conscientious objection renders conscientious objection a
strange and alien phenomenon to the nonreligious. More importantly,
to do so erroneously suggests that the professional has no positions
concerning the ethics of her own practice.” [20]
+: Broad reason containing
predominantly narrow
reasons for CO
Respecting importance of
conscience or CO (+ 11/− 1;
rm.:24) [MR]
“When we describe a person as having acted on the grounds of conscience, we
typically mean that she “acted on the basis of a sincere conviction about what
is morally required or forbidden.”15 Thus, claims of conscience can be
understood as a subset of moral claims generally one that connotes a strong
link with individual identity and a preference for suffering significant burdens
rather than acting against conscientious belief.” [18]
Criteria for CO (+ 9/− 2;
rm.:36) [MR]
“It must be consistent with the HCP’s other beliefs and actions, particularly those
in proximate areas of concern.” [24]
Moral integrity needs to
be respected (+ 5/− 1;
rm.:22) [MR]
“A moral system that tolerated intolerance would seem internally inconsistent’.”
[24]
Normative value of CO
(+ 4/− 1; rm.:13) [MR]
“Conscience, however, is not so one-sided. Nor is medical decision-making so
straightforward. First, medical decisions -especially those involving questions
of life and death - inspire divergent moral convictions. Second, as I will explain,
medical decisions do not simply implicate conscience for the provider. They
should be thought of instead as involving, at minimum, three parties: patients,
providers, and institutions. This three-sided relationship complicates moral
decision-making, with each party asserting potentially conflicting claims.”
[22]
Conscience is closely
related to identity and
sense of self (+ 4/− 1;
rm.:8) [MR]
“Acting according to conscience has real importance less because it is about
being (morally or politically) right than because it is central to being a whole
person. Both theory and experience indicate that conscience is closely related
to one’s moral integrity or sense of self.” [21]
Respect for autonomy
(+ 3/− 1; rm.:10) [MR]
“Professional conscientious objection in medicine is an instance of the autonomy
of the professions from what is simply legal.’ Professional conscientious objection
differs from religiously grounded objection by being reason-based.”
[20]
Religion does not
permit involvement
(+ 6/− 1; rm.:16) [RR]
“A different basis for possible differentiation concerns what is at stake. Perhaps
religious objectors usually perceive that more is at stake, including their eternal
welfare. This sense of magnitude of impairment might be related to what a
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were mainly against conscientious objection. Such figures
show that there is no category in which the arguments
were entirely in one direction. This is addressed next.
Discussion
This systematic review of reasons has shown that the
identified literature contains many reasons embracing a
wide spectrum of arguments both for and against con-
scientious objection to the provision of abortion care by
nurses or midwives. Most of the authors of the selected
articles state their arguments in ways which leave the
reader in no doubt as to their stance although Greena-
walt [15, 16] attempts to remain neutral through posing
a number of questions to stimulate readerss thoughts.
The majority of the authors accept the need for some
form of conscientious objection by nurses (and, by
default, midwives) The other articles are clearly in favour
of one side of the debate with two specifically concen-
trating on the Christian faith [17, 18]. Most articles seek
clarifications about limits to which conscientious
Table 7 Overview of broad reasons used to argue for or against CO (Continued)
Broad reasons used to argue for or against CO Example of reason mentions
claimant would be willing to sacrifice to avoid doing a wrongful act.”
[15]
Safeguarding conscience
(+ 6/− 1; rm.:23) [LR]
“As a two-way street, the conscience clause acknowledges the legitimacy of
conscience at the level of institutions, while preventing institutions and
individuals from discriminating against those whose consciences differ.”
[20]
+−: Broad reason with
equal amount of narrow
reasons for and against CO
Justifying professional
CO (+ 3/− 3; rm.:9) [PR]
“A final variation concerns public attitudes. If the community is deeply divided
over whether a form of health care involves a serious wrong, there is a powerful
argument that no individual or institution should be required to provide it.”
[15]
Organisational ethics
require consideration
(+ 1/− 1; rm.:2) [PR]
“Organizational ethics is a systematic examination of the morality of collective
actions in human institutions dedicated to some specific purposes in society.
The ethical “code” or commitment of a specific institution is now customarily
expressed in its mission statement. This is in a way the “conscience” of the
institution.” [17]
Legality argument
(+ 2/− 2; rm.:14) [LR]
“Ultimately, there is no real possibility of engaging in the conscience rights
discussion with total deference to the law because the discussion is precisely
about what the law should be. In the end, the legality argument is tautological
and fails to advance the claims made by forced-access advocates.”
[23]
-: Broad reason containing
predominantly narrow
reasons against CO
Requirement to offer a
service (+ 1/− 2; rm.:11)
[MR]
Already we hear ethicists suggesting that physicians must separate their personal
moral beliefs from their professional lives if they wish to practice in a secular
society and remain licensed as fully functioning physicians. [17]
Institutional refusal
(+ 4/− 10; rm.:23) [PR]
“When an entire institution refuses to deliver common medical procedures, like
contraception and abortion, the risk to patients is further magnified. First of all,
access becomes a more significant issue. Patients’ choice of a healthcare facility
is more limited than their choice of an individual doctor.” [22]
Degree of involvement
among HCP is different
(+ 1/− 2; rm.:5)[PR]
“The intrinsic relevance of degree of involvement is more debatable. According
to most people’s ordinary sense, if a person’s job calls upon her to receive
answers from questionnaires that admitted patients have answered and to
exchange a few words with those patients, an objection to such contact with
the patients who happen to be entering to receive abortions would be
unreasonable.” [15]
Religious toleration has
multiple dimensions
(+ 1/− 2; rm.:3) [RR]
“Moreover, secular religiousity, which supposedly tolerates differences, does so
only within a narrow range of so-called “values” that are supposedly “free” of
religious or religious taint. But secular religiousity is itself an orthodoxy. Its
“values” are based in democratic procedures, personal preference as the basis
for religious choice, commitment to a free market economy, the commodification
of health care, and an eschewal of religious belief. To deviate from this notion of
religious “neutrality” in public policy is to be “undemocratic,” prejudiced, and
intolerably sectarian.” [17]
- -: Broad reason
containing only narrow
reasons against CO
Imposing own beliefs
(+ 0/− 2; rm.:7) [MR]
“The “Imposing Your Beliefs” Argument Imposes a Rejection of Hippocratic
Principles.” [23]
Critique of the conscience
clause (+ 0/− 2; rm.:2) [LR]
“Immunity goes far beyond what is necessary to protect the moral integrity
of medical providers. It destabilizes the medical profession’s duties to do no
harm and respect patient autonomy. It endangers the very trust upon which
the profession relies.” [22]
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objection should be permitted, one suggesting that the
idea of referral could be seen as “complicity in wrong-
doing” [19:239] but the majority taking the approach
that some form of referral is necessary [17, 19, 20].
Sepper’s two articles focus strongly in favour of pre-
senting arguments for or against institutional “con-
sciences” [21, 22].
The polarities found in our current review are articu-
lated in one article’s finding that the existing debate
about conscientious objection is characterised by con-
flicting positions between patients’ right to access legal
health services and health professionals’ right to practise
with respect to their own consciences [23]. Such con-
flicts are experienced by midwives and nurses who are
confronted with the “dual commitment” noted in two of
the publications [21, 22]. In order to illustrate this no-
tion of “dual commitment” further, we now discuss two
broad reasons that differed in their line of argument but
containing similar numbers of reason mentions. The
broad reason “respecting importance of conscience” is
an exemplar of an argument predominantly in favour of
conscientious objection. It contains 11 narrow reasons
for and one against conscientious objection with a total
of 24 reason mentions. We then selected “institutional
refusal” as an example of a broad reason that was used
to argue predominantly against individual freedom of
conscientious objection with 10 narrow reasons against
conscientious objection and four in its favour with 23
reason mentions. By making this selection, rather than
offering a detailed discussion of the broad reasons argu-
ing only in one direction, we acknowledge and support
the claim for a content-neutral approach to the accom-
modation of conscience as recommended by Sawicki
who stated that respecting various available arguments is
an important principle for a pluralistic society [18]. The
discussion of these two broad reasons also notes Sep-
per’s warning to take conscience seriously by reflecting
upon all available arguments [21]. These two selected
reasons will now be discussed in relation to the litera-
ture we analysed.
As noted previously, the broad reason: “Respecting
importance of conscience”, that was derived from five
of the 11 selected articles, was predominantly in
favour of conscientious objection by nurses or mid-
wives. Sawicki, arguing particularly powerfully that
conscience exists within all human beings from the
beginning of life, suggested that “even the youngest
child has some understanding of right and wrong as
the nagging feeling of shame when she has made the
wrong decision” suggests. She further argued that at
times a person’s conscience is so powerful that it
compels that person to act against the dominant
trends and feeling bound by “volitional necessity” [18:
1395]. Pellegrino supports this argument claiming that
conscience impels a person to act in a certain way,
“the judgments of conscience are morally binding, i.e.,
they must be followed or the moral agent has acted
immorally and accountably” [9:227]. Like Sawicki [18],
he goes further, suggesting that “to ignore this ‘inner
voice’ is to induce guilt, remorse, and shame. Only
the amoral sociopath escapes the grip of conscience”
[9:227]. Greenawalt, similarly, referred to the “inner
voice” by arguing from the stance of the “intrinsic na-
ture of conscience” and suggesting that if people felt
strongly that “an act would violate their conscience,
they will be hesitant to perform the act, even under
pressure” [17:97]. Sepper, however, argued from a dif-
ferent perspective, proposing that conscience “may be
experienced retrospectively, generating guilt or regret,
or prospectively, generating a sense that failure to re-
solve these conflicting demands will risk one’s sense
of self,” thereby coming to the fore following the ac-
tions rather than preceding them [22:1528]. While all
these authors therefore agreed that respecting con-
science was important, there was failure to agree as
to the nature of conscience and when it manifested
itself.
The second broad reason we selected was “institu-
tional refusal” which was derived from the arguments of
six authors, four of whom also contributed to the reason
discussed above. It respects that the decision to invoke a
conscientious objection by a nurse or midwife to the
provision of abortion services means that other health
professionals may be required to assume an additional
workload that they may resent. Two of the articles ar-
gued that allowing conscientious objection may lead to a
greater risk of patient injury in emergencies, Sepper stat-
ing, “the presence of any refuser risks delays, the trau-
matizing of patients, and bodily harm” [22:1552}. Each
of these authors also argued that allowing conscientious
objection to be invoked gave patients fewer options in
other areas of reproductive care, Sepper noting, “In the
most difficult cases, a particular service might become
unavailable in a particular community because the sole
specialist…. refuses to provide it”. [22:1569]. However,
the author does not suggest what these services might
be and how this cause and effect would come about.
Chavkin et al., whose article took an international per-
spective, supported this line of reasoning providing a vis-
ual schema outlining potential ramifications of refusal
such as increased maternal mortality and morbidity and
stigmatising of providers who are prepared to provide
the service. However, as these authors have cautioned,
this was derived from a process of logical reasoning ra-
ther than from the collection of empirical data [14].
In addressing this issue, Fovargue and Neal suggested
that there was a need to take a step back as a, “lack of
clarity about the proper limits of conscientious refusal to
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participate in particular healthcare practices has given
rise to fears that, in the absence of clear parameters,
conscience-based exemptions by midwives may become
increasingly widespread, leading to intolerable burdens
on health professionals, patients, and institutions” [19:
221]. Sepper summed up both sides of the argument
suggesting that institutional refusal may actually encour-
age refusal unrelated to moral reasoning and that con-
science legislation “is under-inclusive with regard to
willing providers and patients alike… At the same time,
the legislation is over-inclusive, sweeping in refusal for
reasons unrelated to conscience. So doing, it short-
circuits ethical discussion and development” [23:403].
Arguing in favour of conscientious objection, Cava-
naugh [20] proposed that conscientious objection cannot
be limited to individuals as “to exclude institutional
health providers from conscience clause protection is
merely an indirect way of denying the conscience and
morality of the individuals whose will and purposes the
entities were created to effect” [21:196]. Using the ex-
ample of institutions run by the Catholic Church, Sepper
noted that ethical and religious directives for Catholic
health care exist in the United States and as a condition
of employment all medical providers [including mid-
wives and nurses] are required to follow the Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.
She suggests that by denying institutional conscientious
objection, “this proposal effectively prevents those facil-
ities that actually bring together people based on shared
convictions from forming associations and excluding
dissenters”, thereby denying the rights of individuals [22:
1560]. Pellegrino concurs, arguing “the right to refuse
care has rapidly metamorphosed into a right to demand
and dictate the details of care” [9:223].
This more detailed look at the two selected broad rea-
sons illustrates some of the diversity in not only the se-
lected literature but also in the many articles that were
considered for inclusion in this review. It further high-
lights how the same arguments can be used to illustrate
both arguments for and against conscientious objection
by nurses, midwives and other health care providers. As
the number of narrow reasons contained within each
broad reason become more balanced, this point was
emphasised. For example, in the category of “practical
reasons”, the broad reason “justifying professional con-
scientious objection” contained three narrow reasons in
favour and three against conscientious objection, Sawicki
summing it up as “because individuals with strong con-
scientious beliefs may find themselves torn between their
beliefs and the requirements or expectations of the law”
[18:1400]. She is countered by Chavkin et al. who state
unequivocally that “providers have a professional duty to
follow scientifically and professionally determined def-
initions of reproductive health services, and not to
misrepresent them on the basis of personal beliefs”
[20:550]. With a reference to our findings, it seems
unlikely that middle ground will ever be found be-
tween these two views and generally in this whole
debate.
Limitations
While our review applied Strech and Sofaer’s method
[12] we noted a number of limitations associated with
this approach. Although a numerical consideration is the
approach taken by Strech and Sofaer in evaluating
argument-based literature, it lacks the in-depth consider-
ation of important but rare arguments. While respecting
the number of reason mentions that brought the two
broad reasons “respecting importance of conscience”
and “institutional refusal” to the top of our list, we
agreed within our team that other broad reasons deserve
attention even if mentioned less frequently. We also
identified that there are specific narrow reasons that are
worthy of attention despite being rarely mentioned, for
example the narrow reason “conscience is the law of the
intellect” in which the underlying reason mention states,
“conscience is called “the law of our intellect” because it
is a judgment of reason deduced from natural law” [9:
226]. We consider this argument as important, because
it views conscience as something special that interacts
both with the intellect and the “law” intellectuals give
themselves. However, it only attracted one reason men-
tion. This example made us reflect upon the general na-
ture of conducting a systematic review of reasons and
conclude that understanding the broad reasons in our
systematic review of reason may have benefitted from a
more individual discussion of each broad reason apart
from its numerical and hierarchical classification. There-
fore, the contribution of our review is to bring into relief
how people argue about accommodating conscientious
objection and the reasons they use to support their argu-
ments so that it can become clearer the grounds on
which people are basing their arguments. By concentrat-
ing on the deliberative element of the debates, it may be
possible to find areas of agreement between different po-
sitions, or at least areas where some common ground
may be formed.
Despite the rigorous process we adopted for selecting
the articles, it can clearly be seen that with one excep-
tion [24], all of them come from publications originating
from the United States of America. Similarly, seven of
the articles’ authors are lawyers, the remaining four au-
thors being two physicians and two philosophers. It was
disappointing that only one article selected came from
Europe and none was written by nurses or midwives.
This caused us to reconsider our final selection strategy
in stage four when we reduced 47 articles to the final 10.
One article in that round had been written by a nurse
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based in the UK but, although it contained information
relevant to the change in techniques of inducing abor-
tion, we rejected it because it was focused primarily on
the management of conscientious objection rather than
reasons for it [25].
All the articles chosen did discuss nurses, but mid-
wives were scarcely mentioned possibly because mid-
wives do not have a strong presence in the USA. The
only article that specifically discussed midwives was that
of Forvague and Neal [24] which came from Europe.
Several authors suggested that while they primarily re-
ferred to physicians they also included nurses with Cava-
naugh defining nurses and pharmacists as “medical
professionals” while others such as ultrasound techni-
cians and radiographers are not [21: 190]. We hypothe-
sise that if more articles were written in Europe
midwives would be more likely to be considered.
Conclusion
The whole area of conscientious objection remains a
very sensitive topic that needs to be considered in its en-
tirety respecting both the arguments for and against its
provision. We identified no arguments solely for or
against conscientious objection by midwives or nurses.
Our findings emphasise that, in order to address the
issue of accommodating conscientious objection appro-
priately, multiple dimensions/perspectives have to be
considered. The arguments in the literature predomin-
antly emphasise the need for accommodating conscien-
tious objection, therefore a balanced debate focusing on
a variety of available arguments is necessary in this
multi-faceted field of research. It is important that such
debate considers the rights of midwives and nurses not
to have to provide such a service if it is contrary to their
conscience, and not only on the rights of women seeking
abortions.
Further, we conclude that during the stage of identify-
ing literature that meets the eligibility criteria for this re-
view, midwives and nurses remain invisible, either
hidden in the more generic “health” or even “medical”
professionals, in the debates over conscientious objec-
tion. Additionally, few midwives and nurses have pub-
lished in this area with no article authored by a nurse or
midwife meeting our inclusion criteria. This reflects a
gap between existing literature and practice because not
only are midwives and nurses frequently confronted with
providing abortion services in practice but the major
policy drivers from WHO recommends them as the
key providers of first and mid trimester abortions.
The developing role of midwives and nurses in this
area therefore merits urgent consideration and there
is a need for both theoretical and empirical research
to investigate the changes in abortion practice and
how this affects the roles and responsibilities of
midwives and nurses and how, in turn, this impacts
on the conscientious objection debate.
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